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Abstract. In this paper I argue, based on a comparison of Spinoza‟s 
and Descartes‟s discussion of error, that beliefs are affirmations of the 
content of imagination that is not false in itself, only in relation to the object. 
This interpretation is an improvement both on the winning ideas reading and 
on the interpretation reading of beliefs. Contrary to the winning ideas reading 
it is able to explain belief revision concerning the same representation. Also, it 
does not need the assumption that I misinterpret my otherwise correct ideas 
as the interpretation reading would have it. In the first section I will provide a 
brief overview of the notion of inherence and its role in Spinoza‟s discussion 
of the status of finite minds. Then by examining the relation between 
Spinoza‟s and Descartes‟ distinction of representations and attitudes, I show 
that affirmation can be identified with beliefs in Spinoza. Next, I will take a 
closer look at the identification of intellect and will and argue that Spinoza‟s 
identification of the two is based on the fact that Spinoza sees both as the 
active aspect of the mind. After that, I analyze Spinoza‟s comments on the 
different scopes of will and intellect, and argue that beliefs are affirmations of 
the imaginative content of the idea. Finally, through Spinoza‟s example of the 
utterance of mathematical error, I present my solution to the problem of 
inherence of false beliefs. 
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Introduction 
The status of false beliefs – as opposed to the status of inadequate ideas – is a 
hotly debated topic in Spinoza scholarship. The question of inadequacy on its own 
does not seem to pose a problem: the sun seems to be small and close because the 
celestial body affects my body in a specific manner. Since this idea showing the sun to 
be small and close is an idea of imagination and not complete, it is inadequate. But 
what is the status of my false belief that the sun not only seems to be small and close, 
but it is indeed small and 200 feet away (cf. E2p35s, E4p1s)?1 
Concerning this question there have been two radically different answers. On 
the one hand, there are those who argue that the very distinction that this question 
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presupposes, namely the distinction between ideas and beliefs, is incomprehensible in 
Spinoza‟s philosophical framework. In E2p48-49, among others, Spinoza famously 
maintains that all ideas involve affirmation or negation, they are not like mute pictures. 
That is, my belief that the sun is 200 feet away is just my idea showing the sun to be 
200 feet away.2 On the other hand, there are those who argue that the distinction 
between ideas and beliefs is intelligible in Spinoza and we should read beliefs as 
interpretations of ideas. That is, when I erroneously believe the sun to be 200 feet 
away I interpret my idea showing the sun to be small and close – possibly in light of 
my other ideas – as involving the affirmation that the sun is 200 feet away.3 
As I will argue later in this article, both interpretations are problematic for a 
number of reasons. However, the problem affecting both interpretations, on which I 
will focus in this article, is the question of the inherence of these false beliefs. False 
beliefs – be simply ideas, or interpretations of ideas – are modes of thinking that are 
false. However, everything is in (or to use the technical term: inheres in) God, 
including these false beliefs (E1p15). And ideas are supposed to be true insofar as they 
are related to God (E2p32). And this has unwelcome ramifications for both 
interpretations: on the one hand, if the false belief is just the idea, as the first 
interpretation maintains, and every idea inheres in God, then one has to be able to 
explain how false ideas can inhere in God. On the other hand, if false beliefs are 
interpretations of ideas, these interpretations are presumably also modes of thinking, 
which have to inhere ultimately in God and therefore, again, it needs to be explained 
how false ideas can inhere in God. 
In this paper I argue, based on a comparison of Spinoza‟s and Descartes‟s discussion 
of error, that in Spinoza beliefs are affirmations4 of the content of imagination. On my 
reading actually there are no false beliefs, only beliefs that are inadequate in relation to 
their object. In the first section I will provide a brief overview of the notion of 
inherence and its role in Spinoza‟s discussion of the status of finite minds. In the 
second section by examining the relation between Spinoza‟s and Descartes‟ distinction 
of representations and attitudes I show that affirmation can be identified with beliefs 
in Spinoza. In the third section I will take a closer look at the identification of intellect 
and will, and argue that Spinoza‟s identification of the two is based on the fact that 
Spinoza sees both as the active aspect of the mind. In the fourth section I analyze 
Spinoza‟s comments on the different scopes of will and intellect, and argue that beliefs 
are affirmations of the imaginative content of the idea. In the fifth section through 
Spinoza‟s example of the utterance of mathematical error I present my solution to the 
problem of inherence of false beliefs. In the conclusion I summarize my argument and 
how it improves on the existing interpretations. 
 
Inherence and finite minds 
Spinoza defines the substance as what is in itself (inheres in itself) and the 
modes as what is in another (inheres in something else) (E1d3, E1d5). Historically 
inherence is a relation between a substance and its accidents, and it has been claimed 
that this relation is defined by predication: substances cannot be predicated of other 
things, while accidents can be predicated of other things.5 As Curley noted, however, 
“ordinary finite things are of the wrong logical type to be predicable of anything”.6 
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Therefore, he interpreted inherence relation as efficient causation: the mode is in the 
substance because the substance is the efficient cause of the mode. 
This interpretation has been challenged both on historical 7  and textual 
grounds,8  and it has been argued that inherence should be understood along the 
traditional lines. This understanding, however, raises the problem of partial inherence: 
what do inadequately caused modes inhere in? Two different interpretations have 
been proposed in order to answer this question. First, according to Della Rocca, 
inherence, causation and existence are just different expressions of conceptual 
dependence, and therefore the effect inheres partially in its partial causes.9 Second, 
according to Garrett and Melamed, there are two different kinds of inherence: 
causation by eternal entities implies inherence (immanent causation), while causation 
by finite entities does not (transient causation). When the substance causes its infinite 
or finite modes, these modes are in the substance, but when a number of finite modes 
cause another finite mode together, the effect is not in its causes: there is no way in 
which we could make sense of the claim that the table is partially in the carpenter.10 
Both readings have advantages: Della Rocca‟s is more consistent with other 
aspects of Spinoza‟s metaphysics,11 while Garrett and Melamed are historically better 
situated. However, the problem of inherence is not only a metaphysical problem, it is 
also a problem about the unity of nature in Spinoza. According to Spinoza‟s 
philosophy of mind there is an idea of my body in God which is supposedly adequate 
given the fact that it is in God (E2p32). Also, there is an idea of my body that 
constitutes my mind and that we know to be very confused (E2p23, E2p27). This 
presents the problem of “two minds” and of the validity of subjective experience: 
what do the ideas of the finite mind inhere in and what is their relation to the ideas in 
the infinite intellect?12 
There are three possible answers. First, on Della Rocca‟s reading the 
inadequate idea is a less perfect and less real version of God‟s idea only partially 
inhering in anything, and what really exists is the idea as it is in God. The inadequacy 
that essentially belongs to the finite perspective becomes a principle of non-being.13 
Second, there is a similar possible position, according to which although there are no 
degrees of existence finite modes do not inhere in anything fully because all finite 
modes exist for the same degree as illusions. What really exists is the one substance: 
the idea as it is in God exits, the idea as it is in my subjective experience is an 
appearance. On both of these views, as I acquire adequate ideas and see things under a 
species of eternity, I become more real, but at the same time I also lose my finite 
perspective and subjectivity. These readings have a strong idealist undertone which 
was mainstream in the 19th century, but few would accept today.14 Third, the most 
widely accepted option is to claim that both the idea of the finite subject and the idea 
of God are real.15 This option, however, is only available if we can explain either what 
are inadequate ideas inhering in, or how can they inhere in God. 
This is a problem because on the one hand, everything is supposed to inhere 
ultimately in God, and on the other hand, in God there are supposedly no inadequate 
ideas. 16  The description of E2p11c would naturally imply that when I have an 
inadequate idea what I have is a partial grasp on the idea. However, my idea that the 
sun is 200 feet away is not a partial truth, it represents something that is not the case.17 
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This problem can be most naturally solved by appealing to different interpretations of 
the same idea: the idea in me actually represents the modification of my body, 
however, it can be interpreted as being about the external object, 18  or I cannot 
distinguish the properties that it acquires in virtue of being my idea and in virtue of 
being my idea of its object,19 or in light of my social and historical context and the 
other ideas I have it acquires a fictitious interpretation.20 
This line of interpretation can easily account for the fact that a 
misrepresenting idea inheres in God: in imagination21 the natures of different bodies 
are necessarily mixed, and therefore I acquire a bodily modification that presents the 
sun as being small and close.22 However, as I have argued in the introduction, these 
interpretations need to account for the metaphysical status of beliefs. So, what I 
analyze in this paper is not how the misrepresenting idea is brought about, but rather 
the questions: what is the metaphysical status of my erroneous assent to a false 
interpretation of this idea (is this assent an idea, an aspect of an idea or a relation 
between different ideas etc.?) and how this assent can inhere in God given that all 
ideas are adequate in God and there is no form of falsity (E2p32)? In the next section 
I justify my claim that beliefs and ideas can – at least conceptually – be distinguished 
in Spinoza. 
 
Beliefs and affirmations 
In Spinoza‟s philosophy of mind the status of beliefs is unfortunately not as 
clear as one could wish for. In Descartes it is more or less uncontroversial that there 
are two types of ideas: first, ideas that are representations, and, second, attitudes 
toward these representations. These attitudes involve emotions, desires and volitions, 
as well as judgments. To this category belong modes of thought by which the mind 
judges about the content of the representations. This is what we would call today 
beliefs. This distinction has been most famously articulated in the Meditations: 
 
Some of my thoughts are as it were the images of things, and it is only 
in these cases that the term „idea‟ is strictly appropriate – for example, 
when I think of a man, or a chimera, or the sky, or an angel, or God. 
Other thoughts have various additional forms: thus when I will, or 
am afraid, or affirm, or deny, there is always a particular thing which I 
take as the object of my thought, but my thought includes something 
more than the likeness of that thing. Some thoughts in this category 
are called volitions or emotions, while others are called judgements.23 
 
This distinction is followed by Descartes‟s important claim that our representations 
are not erroneous in themselves: error only arises when the scope of my will is greater 
than the scope of my intellect.24 In this case I affirm a representation as veridical even 
though it is not a clear and distinct idea, and therefore it can be misrepresenting. He 
has coupled this approach with a distinction between the free and active intellectual 
faculty25 of will and the passive embodied faculty of representations and passions that 
became more pronounced in his later The Passions of the Soul.26 On this view, since what 
is up to us is really our affirmation provided by our will, our moral responsibility is 
 
 
 
Olivér István Tóth – Inherence of False Beliefs in Spinoza’s Ethics 
78 
grounded in this faculty. 27  This implies that on Descartes‟s view on theoretical 
philosophy (1) I should suspend my judgment concerning my ideas that are not clear 
and distinct, (2) affirm those ideas that are clear and distinct and use them to produce 
more clear and distinct ideas. This is exemplified by his famous example of the sun – 
also used by Spinoza, which I will discuss later –: although I have an imaginative idea 
of the sun, there (1) is no error in it as long as I do not affirm it as veridical. What I 
should do instead is (2) construct a different, intellectual idea of the sun which being 
clear and distinct I can affirm.28 
Spinoza modifies this picture in at least two important ways. First, he argues 
that free will is an illusion, and even what Descartes regarded as the active aspect of 
my mind is determined (E1app, E2p35s, E3p2s, E4prae).29 Second, he argues that 
every idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves affirmation or negation (E2p49).30 These 
two claims taken together might suggest the view that Spinoza simply rejects 
Descartes‟s distinction between the two classes of ideas and he held the view that 
mental life is “one dimensional”: representations are at the same time attitudes. 
The general claim that Spinoza identifies beliefs with affirmations included in 
every idea is supported by Spinoza‟s discussion of the relationship of will and intellect 
in E2p48-49 where he explicitly engages the Cartesian doctrine. For example, in 
E2p49cs he claims to have rejected “what is commonly maintained to be the cause of 
error”, that is, by showing that intellect and will are identical he refutes the Cartesian 
claim that the will‟s free affirming of the ideas of the intellect is the source of error. 
Later in the same scholium he addresses the objections that a Cartesian is expected to 
raise, among which there are two objections that are relevant for our purposes: (1) that 
we know from experience that our will has a greater scope than our intellect and (2) 
that we know from experience that we can suspend judgment. I will come back to the 
discussion of this scholium later, but what I want to establish here is that while 
Spinoza tries to clarify the difference between his position and Descartes‟s position 
and calls attention to changes in his vocabulary (e.g. concerning the intellect), he is 
quite happy to identify affirmation with beliefs in the Cartesian sense.31 This seems to 
fit very well with the “one dimensional” reading of Spinoza. 
If, however, we take a closer look at Spinoza‟s use of the idea of the sun – 
which is an obvious reference to Descartes‟ discussion of the same problem in the 
Meditations –, this reading becomes problematic. 
 
For example, when we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about two 
hundred feet away from us. In this we are deceived so long as we are 
ignorant of its true distance; but when its distance is known, the error 
is removed, not the imagination, that is, the idea of the sun, which 
explains its nature only so far as the body is affected by it. And so, 
although we come to know the true distance, we shall nevertheless 
imagine it as near us. For as we said in IIP35S, we do not imagine the 
sun to be so near because we are ignorant of its true distance, but 
because the mind conceives the sun‟s size insofar as the body is 
affected by the sun.  
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And so it is with the other imaginations by which the mind is 
deceived, whether they indicate the natural constitution of the body, 
or that its power of acting is increased or diminished: they are not 
contrary to the true, and do not disappear on its presence. (E4p1s, cf. 
E2p35s)32 
 
Here Spinoza refers to our everyday experience that even though as a child we might 
have believed that the sun is small and close, and later as an adult we believe that it is a 
huge star very far away, we nevertheless see the sun the same way. That is, we have 
different beliefs concerning the content of the same experience. And this is described 
in Spinoza as the claim that ”the error is removed, not the imagination”. Here, the 
perplexing claim is that imagination, which is “the idea of the sun, which explains its 
nature only so far as the body is affected by it”, is  “not contrary to the true, and do 
not disappear on its presence”. In the Cartesian framework this would have been a 
standard claim: as we have seen the imaginative idea of the sun is not erroneous in 
Descartes‟s example, it is our judgment about it that can be true or false. However, as 
we have seen, one of Spinoza‟s central modification of Descartes‟s theory was 
precisely the claim that every idea as an idea involves affirmation or negation.33 
In order to answer the question about how imaginations are not erroneous in 
themselves when every idea involves an affirmation two general lines of interpretation 
have been proposed, both of which presuppose a very different interpretation of 
Spinoza‟s philosophy of mind and ethics. Although different proponents of each line 
vary significantly, I will not be able to engage with every interpretation in detail. What 
I would like to show in the following is that there are those who try to maintain the 
identity of the representational content of ideas and beliefs, even in face of the 
difficulties described, and those who try to somehow reintroduce a distinction 
between representative ideas and judgments, even in face of Spinoza‟s apparent denial 
of this distinction. As I will argue, both general lines of interpretation have merits, but 
neither of them can account for the inherence of false beliefs. 
According to the first line of interpretation, ideas have a potentially unlimited, 
externally directed motivating force. On this view we may not necessarily be able to 
talk about beliefs in the traditional sense in Spinoza because our will is just the set of 
winning ideas – the effects of stronger causes – on which the subject acts. This means 
that deciding what we want is not an all-or-nothing issue, rather a matter of degrees. 
When I am deliberating whether to drink the liquid in the cup in front of me, I have 
two – or potentially infinite number of – ideas concerning the nature of the liquid. 
One idea holds that it is water, the other idea that it is plutonium. Both ideas have 
some power, and the more powerful idea will be the winning idea on which I act and 
therefore it will qualify as my belief. The power of each idea is mostly determined by 
its causes, but of course its compatibility with my other powerful ideas also plays a 
role. I may have powerful ideas about my environment being a fairly normal 
household where the likelihood of a cup containing plutonium is relatively small. Even 
if the idea that the liquid is plutonium was originally very powerful because of my 
slightly paranoid mindset, the idea concerning my environment reduces the chance of 
its winning.34 
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The problem with this reading is that it implies that the human mind has an 
infinite number of misrepresenting ideas involving false judgments. There is no 
problem in explaining how these ideas are formed: partial causation is ubiquitous and 
they can produce a number of different modes. But the problem is that on this 
interpretation, it is not the case that actually I have a veridical idea (e.g. that there is a 
cup of water in front of me or an idea that I have a bodily modification showing a cup 
of plutonium in front of me) that is then misinterpreted by my mind because of its 
lack of knowledge. I actually have an idea that there is a cup of plutonium in front of 
me, since the representational content of the given idea is just the judgment. This, 
however, raises the question: how can this idea be true insofar as it is related to God? 
Of course, Della Rocca can avoid the question by his notion of partial inherence 
which implies partial existence: my idea that there is a cup of plutonium in front of me 
is just less real than my idea that there is a cup of water in front of me. However 
consistent and ingenious this solution is, I agree with Melamed that as an 
interpretation of Spinoza, this is not a viable option: partial inherence and partial 
existence are notions widespread in German Idealism, but totally foreign in the early 
modern context generally, and in Spinoza‟s philosophy specifically.35 Also, I do not 
see how this reading can maintain that imaginations are not erroneous in themselves: 
even if my idea that there is a cup of plutonium in front of me is a losing idea, the 
judgment involved in the idea is strictly speaking false. 
According to the second line of interpretation, ideas are ultimately about 
ourselves and it is central for Spinoza‟s ethical project to limit the scope of our 
volitions to the actual object of our ideas, namely to our own body. On this 
interpretation, every externally oriented motivation is just the result of our will being 
corrupted by epistemically deficient inadequate ideas. Thus, beliefs are interpretations 
of ideas, or aspects of the ideas that are linked to the essence of the human mind. The 
central claim of this interpretation is that we can distinguish between two objects of 
the idea. On the one hand, there is the actual object (objectum) and content of the idea, 
which is the bodily modification with which the idea is identical. On the other hand, 
there is the interpretation of its content that is causally efficacious in the mind, and 
which identifies what the subject takes to be the object of the idea (ideatum).36 That is, 
when I form the belief that there is a cup of plutonium in front of me, actually I have 
an idea that my body is modified by external causes in such a way that it presents the 
image of a cup of plutonium. However, it can happen that because of my less than 
perfect knowledge concerning the causes of this idea I interpret it as not being about 
the modification of my body, but rather about an external object, namely about the 
cup in front of me.37 
I argue that this reading does not solve the problem of false belief, since it did 
not provide a clear answer to the question what are false beliefs and what do they 
inhere in? On the winning idea reading beliefs were powerful ideas, on the 
interpretation reading they are interpretations: but what are actually these 
interpretations? On Spinoza‟s metaphysics the natural candidates are: an idea, a 
relation of ideas and an aspect of the idea. 
First, the belief can be another idea about the original idea, but then in the 
case of false beliefs we have the same problem that apparently there is an idea in God 
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which is plainly false. Second, Malinowski-Charles has proposed that belief is the 
relation between the human mind and the idea that can either confirm the order of 
intellect or not.38  However, on Spinoza‟s metaphysics “except for substances and 
modes there is nothing” (E1p15d) which claim is reflected in the basic commitment of 
Spinoza‟s philosophy of mind that there is no substrate behind its acts.39 This is 
supported by Spinoza positively stating that the will and intellect are modes of 
thinking (E1p32d). Therefore, if relations are indeed beliefs, we need an account how 
relations can qualify as modes and then why it is not problematic that these apparently 
false modes of thought inhere in God. Third, belief could be an aspect of the idea. If it 
is an aspect of an idea, it is either a mode of thought, or not. If it is a mode of thought, 
then even if we don‟t call it an idea we have the original problem that there is a false 
mode of thought in God. If it is not a mode of thought, then we have the same 
problem confronted by Malinowski-Charles‟s interpretation that there does not seem 
to be metaphysical room for other entities than modes.40 
 
Identity of intellect and will 
So far we have seen that the status of beliefs as affirmation poses a problem 
for Spinoza because of his commitment to two claims concerning the relation of 
affirmation and ideas. On the one hand, he has embraced the Cartesian view that 
imaginations are not erroneous in themselves, on the other hand, he has presented his 
revisionary view that every idea insofar as it is an idea involves affirmation. We have 
seen that two lines of interpretation tried to solve the problem. One line argued that 
beliefs are winning ideas, while a second line argued that beliefs are interpretations of 
ideas. As we have seen, neither interpretation could explain how false beliefs can 
inhere in God. On the idealist reading this is the result we could expect, since falsity is 
privation of not just knowledge, but also of existence: false ideas are strictly speaking 
illusions or non-beings. This position, however, entails the acosmist reading, according 
to which the subjective experience amounts to nothing, which is according to the 
majority of scholars foreign to Spinoza. This motivates the search for a better 
interpretation that can reconcile the existence of false beliefs with their inherence in 
God. I argue that the best place to look for such an interpretation is Spinoza‟s 
revisionary claim about the identity of intellect and will. 
Spinoza‟s discussion of the identity of intellect and will is presented in E2p48-
49. These propositions introduce a new topic relative to the earlier propositions, as it 
is evident from the fact that earlier propositions build upon one another, while the 
proposition closest to E2p48 cited in E2p48d is E2p11.41 E2p48 presents the claim 
that there is no free will in the mind. This is derived from the fact that every finite 
mode is caused by another finite mode (E1p28). In the scholium Spinoza situates 
E2p48-49 in his general attack on the Cartesian account. On his description, in E2p48 
he has established that affirmations are modes of thought and as such determined. 
Next, in E2p49 Spinoza is set to elaborate on the question whether affirmations and 
ideas are two different things as Descartes held, or affirmations are nothing “beyond 
the very ideas of things.” (E2p48s)42 
In E2p49 Spinoza answers this question negatively and presents his claim that 
in the mind affirmations and ideas are identical. The demonstration uses the example 
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of the affirmation of the sum of the angles of the triangle: in the first step Spinoza 
uses E2p48 in order to establish that affirmations are modes of thought. Then, he 
cites E2a3 to establish that for every affirmation there must be an idea. Then, he 
simply states that the given idea must involve the affirmation, from which he 
concludes by the definition of essence (E2d2) that: “affirmation pertains to the 
essence of the idea of the triangle and is nothing beyond it [and] it is nothing apart 
from the idea.” (E2p49d) 43  From the proposition the corollary is derived: since 
according to E2p48 “will and the intellect are nothing apart from the singular volitions 
and ideas themselves”44 and by E2p49 “singular volitions and ideas are one and the 
same”45 therefore intellect and will are one and the same. 
In order to support his account and to highlight the difference between his 
and Descartes‟s notion of idea, Spinoza repeatedly rejects the “mute picture” view of 
ideas. In E2p48s Spinoza states that since ideas (as defined in E2d3) are conceptions 
of the mind, they are different from mere representations. Spinoza later elaborates: 
 
I begin, therefore, by warning my readers, first, to distinguish 
accurately between an idea, or concept, of the mind, and the images of 
things which we imagine. […] Indeed, those who think that ideas 
consist in images which are formed in us from encounters with [NS: 
external] bodies, are convinced that those ideas of things [NS: which 
can make no trace in our brains, or] of which we can form no similar 
image [NS: in our brain] are not ideas, but only fictions which we 
feign from a free choice of the will. They look on ideas, therefore, as 
mute pictures on a panel, and preoccupied with this prejudice, do not 
see that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves an affirmation or 
negation. […] He will then understand clearly that an idea (since it is a 
mode of thinking) consists neither in the image of anything, nor in 
words. For the essence of words and of images is constituted only by 
corporeal motions, which do not at all involve the concept of thought. 
(E2p49cs)46 
 
It is obvious from the context that Spinoza‟s criticism is intended to be directed 
against Descartes‟s distinction between the two types of ideas when distinguishing 
between ideas and images, even though it is not obvious that Spinoza‟s criticism is 
well grounded. 47  The essence of images, we are told, is constituted by corporeal 
motion. This passage can be read as the claim that images are bodily modifications, 
while ideas are modes of thought, and Spinoza warns us that we should not confuse 
bodies with ideas. While this might be part of the story,48 I think that there is more to 
this distinction. This is indicated by the use of the term imagination, which refers to 
mental entities.49 
I argue that Spinoza here distinguishes between the aspect of the idea that 
represents the bodily modification and the aspect of the idea that is the judgment 
about the representation. E2p17cs defined imagination as the use of ideas that present 
external bodies as present to us. On that description ideas of imagination are able to 
present external bodies to us because they are ideas of modifications of the body that 
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are caused by external bodies (cf. E2p16). If we read this description together with 
Spinoza‟s statement that imaginations are not erroneous in themselves (E2p17cs, 
E2p35s, E2p49cs, E4p1s), 50  then we can see Spinoza‟s point: namely that the 
representational content of the idea comes from the fact that it is the idea of a 
modification of the body, and therefore it is not erroneous. Spinoza therefore does 
not warn us that we should not confuse bodies with ideas, but rather that we should 
not think that there is nothing over and above the representation in the ideas.51 
Thus, Spinoza‟s claim about the identity of will and intellect amounts to the 
claim that in every idea necessarily there is affirmation where the affirmation is the 
affirmation of the imaginative content. What remains to be seen is the question why 
does he formulate his claim about the parts or aspects of the ideas as a claim about the 
relation of will and intellect. In the next section I will focus on this problem. 
 
Ideas, imagination and the intellect 
In order to specify the relationship of intellect and will, I would like to focus 
first on Spinoza‟s discussion of the scope of will and intellect: 
 
I say that I grant that the will extends more widely than the intellect, 
if by intellect they understand only clear and distinct ideas. But I deny 
that the will extends more widely than perceptions, or the faculty of 
conceiving. (E2p49cs)52 
 
Here, Spinoza immediately concedes that if we understand intellect as Descartes did, 
namely as the set of clear and distinct ideas, then the will has a wider reach than the 
intellect. However, he defines the intellect as all the ideas in virtue of being 
conceptions of the mind.53 At this point, however, we should ask whether Spinoza is 
allowed to identify the intellect with all ideas we have and not just the clear and 
distinct ideas? After all, Spinoza states that: 
 
The eternal part of the mind (by P23 and P29) is the intellect, through 
which alone we are said to act (by IIIP3). But what we have shown to 
perish is the imagination (by P21), through which alone we are said to 
be acted on (by IIIP3 and the Gen. Def. Aff.). (E5p40c)54 
 
E3p3 identifies ideas of bodily modifications adequately caused by us with our 
adequate ideas, therefore the reference to it suggests that the adequate ideas we have 
constitute the intellect, while the inadequate ideas we have constitute the imagination. 
If we also identify adequacy with clarity and distinctness, then Spinoza cannot make 
the move in E2p49cs and identify intellect with all ideas.55 One could write this single 
locus off as either a claim made in an argumentative context, or as a slip of pen. 
However, there are some reasons to doubt the interpretation that intellect and 
imagination are bifurcating sets of ideas. (1) First, this interpretation of distinct ideas 
of imagination and intellect implies that ideas of imagination are inadequate, which 
seems to be supported by the identification of the first kind of knowledge with 
imagination in E2p40s2. However, we have seen that Spinoza repeatedly stresses that 
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imaginations are not false in themselves. (2) Second, in E3p2s Spinoza refers back to 
E2p49 in order to support his claim that volitions do not differ from the imagination, 
which implies by transitivity of identity that the intellect does not differ from the 
imaginations; unless we are ready to write off the use of the term intellect in the whole 
of E2p49 as idiosyncratic to the argumentative context. (3) Third, in E5p7d Spinoza 
cites E2p38 to support his claim that we always imagine common notions in the same 
way. Common notions form the basis of our reason and the second kind of 
knowledge, and are necessarily adequate ideas (E2p38-39, E2p40s2). If, however, 
imaginations and intellect are the sets of inadequate and adequate ideas, respectively, 
how can we imagine adequate ideas? 
In order to solve the problem, I argue, we should go back to the Cartesian 
context. As we have seen, in Descartes the will is the free faculty of our mind by 
which we are said to act. On Spinoza‟s characterization the same properties belong to 
the intellect: it is the principle of our freedom constituted by the mind‟s actions. Also, 
just as in Descartes our will is the source of our moral responsibility, in Spinoza the 
activity of the intellect is the source of our ethical good.56 That the intellect is the 
activity of the mind is the common point in the use of the intellect in the two 
argumentative contexts: in E5p40cs the intellect is the action of the mind and in 
E2p49 intellect and will are the active affirmations that render the mute picture into a 
conception. And now, we should recall Spinoza‟s distinction of will and desire: there 
he states that the will is the affirmation of truth or falsity concerning some content, 
that is, he accepts the Cartesian definition of will. 
In this context it is less surprising that will, understood as affirming, and 
intellect, understood as an active faculty, are identical. What is novel compared to the 
Cartesian account is the activity of intellect. On Descartes‟s description it was the 
passive faculty of perceiving. Let us recall: in Descartes the imagination and the 
intellect were the mind‟s passive powers by which the mind perceives things, while the 
will is the active power by which the mind judges of the representations and 
understandings provided by the imagination and intellect, respectively.57 
I argue that Spinoza‟s reformulation of this division in the Ethics in his 
identification of will and intellect amounts to the claim that both the intellect and the 
will are active powers of the mind and the only passive aspect is the imagination 
providing the representational content. Thus, I agree with Lenz‟s claim that Spinoza is 
committed to the view that beliefs are the minimal units of awareness.58 However, I 
argue that Linz‟s commitment to Della Rocca‟s interpretation of beliefs as winning 
ideas59 invites the same objections as the one dimensional view. Even though he 
distinguishes representations and judgments, on his reading these two are necessarily 
related: there can be no change in judgment without change in representation. 
Consequently, in his interpretation of the example of the sun there are two conflicting 
ideas (one showing the sun to be small and close and the other huge and far away) and 
one of them is winning. 
However, if this interpretation were correct, there would be no way in which 
Spinoza‟s claim that the imaginations are not false in themselves and contrary to the 
truth would be correct. If I have an idea which has the content that the sun is 200 feet 
away, and this idea necessarily involves the affirmation that this is the case, even 
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though this affirmation may be defeated by the affirmation of other more powerful 
ideas, then this idea is false – even though it is not necessarily acted on. My reading 
therefore improves on Lenz‟s analysis on this point: I take Spinoza to say that the 
same representation (or imagination) can instantiate different judgements depending 
on the other ideas I have. When I learn the true distance of the sun, then it is not the 
case that I believe the sun to be 200 feet and 600 Earth diameters away at the same 
time, but act only on the latter belief. Rather, the judgment or interpretation attached 
to the same imagination has changed: although I still see the sun to be small and close, 
now I believe it to be huge and far away. 
To summarize, Spinoza has reformulated the distinction between active and 
passive powers of the mind present in Descartes. In Descartes the passive faculties 
were the imagination and intellect, while the active faculty was the will. In Spinoza 
only the imagination is the passive faculty: intellect and will are both active and 
identical. This also solves the problem, how can intellect not only include the clear and 
distinct ideas, since on Spinoza‟s formulation every idea involves an affirmation. This 
affirmation I have shown to be an activity of the will and the intellect, by which the 
mind understands and affirms it. In the case of the idea that there is a cup of water in 
front of me, the imagination presents the content which I by the same act understand 
as a cup of water in front of me and affirm it. Depending on my other ideas this 
affirmation might be disbelief, or a belief that can lend motivation to action (e.g. to 
drink it if I am thirsty). In the case of the inadequate idea of the sun the same process 
is going on, with the one important distinction that the resulting affirmation produces 
a false belief. Now, the questions that remain to be answered is this: how can I form 
this false belief given that the intellect is supposed to be the action of my mind, and 
what does this false belief inhere in? 
 
Inherence of false beliefs in Spinoza 
In order to answer these questions, I would like to take a closer look at the 
locus where Spinoza discusses the problem of error: 
 
And indeed, most errors consist only in our not rightly applying 
names to things. For when someone says that the lines which are 
drawn from the center of a circle to its circumference are unequal, he 
surely understands (then at least) by a circle something different from 
what mathematicians understand. Similarly, when men err in 
calculating, they have certain numbers in their mind and different 
ones on the paper. So if you consider what they have in mind, they 
really do not err, though they seem to err because we think they have 
in their mind the numbers which are on the paper. (E2p47s)60 
 
Here, Spinoza presents the example of an error committed during calculation. On his 
example, the affirmation of the subject is not erroneous, rather the problem is with 
the fact that the subject identifies the object of his affirmation with the external object. 
Reading the example in the context of the previous discussion concerning the 
relationship of active and passive faculties of the mind, it suggests the following 
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picture. The act by which the intellect understands the representational content of 
imagination, which is identical to the act by which the will affirms the content, is not 
erroneous: even though the subject affirms that the radii of the circle are unequal, this 
affirmation itself is not wrong, simply the subject has chosen a bad word for her 
concept. Similarly, in the case of the sun, when the subject affirms that the sun is 200 
feet away, she does not err, only she has chosen the reference of the affirmation badly. 
Thus, I argue that Spinoza wants to develop the Cartesian claim that 
imaginations are not erroneous in themselves by adding the claim that neither are 
affirmations in themselves. This development is necessitated by his substance monism 
concerning mental states: Descartes was able to hold the view that while imaginations 
are produced according to the natural laws61 created by and depending on God, and 
are therefore not prone to error, judgments are produced by our free will and depend 
exclusively on us and therefore can be true or false. However, this option is not open 
for Spinoza: on the one hand, he denies the existence of free will, and therefore both 
our judgments and our imaginations are produced in accordance with the laws of 
nature; on the other hand, he denies that there are mental states that are not in some 
sense in God and therefore depend on us exclusively. 62  Thus, Spinoza needs an 
account on which the affirmations are not prone to error in themselves – in the same 
fashion as imaginations were immune to error in Descartes. This is expressed by 
Spinoza‟s claim that there is no positive form of falsity (E2p33) and that error does 
not express essence. 63  Also, this connection is behind E2p33d, where Spinoza 
demonstrates the impossibility of a form of falsity by appealing on the fact that the 
form of falsity could not inhere in God. If, however, neither imaginations, nor 
affirmations are false, then what does error consists in? 
The answer to this question is to be found in the example just provided: error 
consists in the object of the affirmation, that is, in the relationship between the 
imagination and the affirmation. There are three elements that produce the state of 
affairs that someone utters the claim “the radii of the circle are unequal”. 
First, there is the bodily modification caused by the external object, namely 
the circle on the paper. This bodily modification is identical to an imagination in the 
mind presenting the external object. Since this is an imagination, this representation of 
the external object is be veridical (E2p16c2). Still, it is not  erroneous in itself, since 
imagination does not contain error. Second, the active affirmation of the mind that 
understands the representation and affirms it. In this case since the imagination is not 
veridical, the will can truly affirm that the geometrical shape has unequal radii. This 
affirmation is not erroneous since it is true about what is in the mind. Third, because 
of the other ideas that the subject has she acts as if the geometrical shape of which the 
true affirmation that it has unequal radii was made and the external object of its 
imagination, namely the circle were identical. Since she was told that there is a circle 
on the paper, she forms the false utterance that the circle has unequal radii. This 
utterance is an act, no less than killing one‟s mother64 or moving one‟s arm up and 
down forcefully (E4p59s). 
So, the imagination, the product of inadequate causation, as a representation 
is not true or false in itself. It shows an ellipsis to be on the paper. Also, there is an 
affirmation that the object of the given idea has unequal radii. This in itself is also not 
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true or false, since there could a possible situation where it would be true; e.g. if the 
shape on the paper would not be a circle, but rather an ellipsis. Finally, there is the 
state of affairs that the object of the affirmation (the ellipsis) has different properties 
than the object of the idea (the circle on the paper). Because of this when I say that 
the radii of the shape on the paper are unequal, I will meet with disapproval from my 
peers. And this amounts to a decrease of my power of acting (conatus) and in this 
sense this belief is false. This provides a solution to the problem presented by 
substance monism for Spinoza. Neither imaginations, nor affirmations are erroneous 
in themselves, and therefore there are no false ideas in God. Rather, epistemic error is 
a result of the wrong combination of an imagination and affirmation, that is, the 
inadequate use of ideas, like affirming the inequality of radii in the case where actually 
there is a circle, or affirming the equality of radii in the case where actually there is an 
ellipsis. Neither the imaginations representing a circle or an ellipsis, nor the 
affirmation that the shape has equal of unequal radii is erroneous in itself. The error 
lies in the relationship of the idea and the external object. 
I think that this analysis of falsity is quite close to Lenz‟s because on both 
accounts epistemic normativity is the product of the intersection of two non-
normative orders depending on the conative aspect of the idea. However, while on his 
reading this normative pressure differentiates between different ideas (e.g. rendering 
the idea that the radii of the shape on the paper are unequal less powerful, and the 
idea that the radii of the shape on the paper are equal more powerful), on my reading 
it necessitates the reinterpretation of my imaginations by recasting my ideas (e.g. by 
turning my idea that the radii of the shape on the paper are unequal into the idea that 
the radii of the shape on the paper though seem to be unequal are in fact equal). 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have set out to answer the question what do false beliefs inhere 
in. We have seen that Spinoza follows Descartes‟s terminology in his usage of 
affirmations, imaginations and the intellect. We can therefore call the representational 
content of an idea imagination, and the affirmation produced by the will belief. We 
have seen that Spinoza maintains following Descartes that imaginations are not 
erroneous in themselves. However, he had a revisionary claim, namely, that every idea 
involves an affirmation. Also, we have seen in the example of the error done in 
calculation that Spinoza wants to deny that our beliefs in themselves are false. 
I have argued that this is possible because the error does not come from the 
imagination we have, or from the belief we have about the imagination, but rather 
from the fact that we act as if our belief was about the external cause and not about 
what was presented by the imagination. While Descartes has maintained that 
imaginations in themselves are not false and only our affirmation and negation can be 
false, Spinoza maintained that both beliefs and imaginations are not false in 
themselves which was required by his substance monism. Therefore he has located 
error in the relation between the idea and its external object which is a relation and not 
a belief. 
This interpretation is an improvement to the winning idea reading in that 
beliefs do not necessarily involve the external cause, they are about the 
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representational content of imagination. I do not have a belief that there is a cup of 
plutonium in front of me; I believe that I perceive a cup of plutonium being in front 
of me and I hold this perception to be veridical. This is important because the former 
belief can never be true if it is not the case that there is a cup of plutonium in front of 
me. The latter belief is underdetermined in this sense: the very same belief can be true 
or not in a different contexts. 
This interpretation is also an improvement to the interpretation reading in that it does 
not imply that there are misinterpretations. When I form the belief that the 
geometrical shape I perceive has unequal radii, it is not a misinterpretation of the idea, 
it is the case. There is no further refining this belief, only belief revision: by the same 
act that I realize that the geometrical shape I perceive has equal radii, I realize that 
what I perceive is a circle. Similarly, my belief that the sun is 200 feet away and my 
belief that the sun is 600 Earth diameter away are not the same belief differently 
interpreted, they are different beliefs of the same object. It is not the case that I realize 
that my belief was not about the external object, but rather about my bodily 
modification: actually I change my belief. 
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understood to be true in both directions (every affirmation is involved by an idea and every 
idea involves an affirmation): cf. “[t]hey look on ideas, therefore, as mute pictures on a 
panel, and preoccupied with this prejudice, do not see that an idea, insofar as it is an idea, 
involves an affirmation or negation.” (E2p49cs) As I will show, this is how the scholarship 
reads Spinoza. 
31 Cf. “it should be noted here that by will I understand a faculty of affirming and denying, 
and not desire. I say that I understand the faculty by which the mind affirms or denies 
something true or something false, and not the desire by which the mind wants a thing or 
avoids it.” (E2p48s) 
32 “Exempli gratia cum solem intuemur, eundem ducentos circiter pedes a nobis distare 
imaginamur, in quo tamdiu fallimur quamdiu veram ejus distantiam ignoramus sed cognita 
ejusdem distantia tollitur quidem error sed non imaginatio hoc est idea solis quæ ejusdem 
naturam eatenus tantum explicat quatenus corpus ab eodem afficitur adeoque quamvis 
veram ejusdem distantiam noscamus, ipsum nihilominus prope nobis adesse imaginabimur. 
Nam ut in scholio propositionis 35 partis II diximus, non ea de causa solem adeo 
propinquum imaginamur quia ejus veram distantiam ignoramus sed quia mens eatenus 
magnitudinem solis concipit quatenus corpus ab eodem afficitur. […] et sic reliquæ 
imaginationes quibus mens fallitur, sive eæ naturalem corporis constitutionem sive quod 
ejusdem agendi potentiam augeri vel minui indicant, vero non sunt contrariæ nec ejusdem 
præsentia evanescunt.” (II/211/18–212/1) 
33 Arguing that Spinoza is equivocating on some terms is not an option here. He repeats his 
commitment both to the claim that imaginations are not erroneous in themselves and to 
the claim that every idea involves affirmation in the context of his engagement with the 
Cartesian theory of belief. When rejecting the possibility of suspension of judgment, he 
states: “I grant that no one is deceived insofar as he perceives, that is, I grant that the 
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imaginations of the mind, considered in themselves, involve no error. But I deny that a 
man affirms nothing insofar as he perceives.” (E2p49cs) 
34 The example and the general description comes from: Della Rocca, M., (2003). The 
“belief as winning idea” view has been also embraced in very different contexts by: Matson, 
W. “Spinoza on Belief,” in Spinoza on Knowledge and the Human Mind (Leiden-New York-
Koln: Brill, 1994), 67–82; Steinberg, D., (2005); Alanen, L., (2011); Lenz, M., (2013); 
Schmid, S., “Spinoza on the Unity of Will and Intellect,” in Partitioning the Soul Debates from 
Plato to Leibniz, ed. K. Corcilius and D. Perler (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2014). 
35 Melamed, Y. Y. (2013). Of course, someone can accept that there is tension in Spinoza‟s 
philosophy and argue that my false beliefs are not inhering in God: Alanen, L., (2011). 
36 For a discussion of this view of intentionality in Spinoza see: Lenz, M., (2012). 
37  The objectum-ideatum description and the main line of interpretation comes from: 
Garrett, D., (2014). His article is greatly influenced by the analysis of error in: Della Rocca, 
M., (1996). Also, Ursula Renz has accepted a similar interpretation view of beliefs, but it is 
a distinct variety that is grounded in her intentionality based interpretation of individuation 
of ideas: Renz, U., (2010); Renz, U., (2011). 
38 Malinowski-Charles, S., (2010). 
39 Renz, U., (2011); Schmid, S. (2014). 
40 Actually there is a fourth option, namely that the idea is just the interpretation, but it is 
not an interpretation of an idea, but rather an interpretation of a bodily state: Renz, U., 
(2010). This option, however, presupposes a very liberal understanding of the identity 
doctrine that I reject. In this paper, however, I cannot present the full details of this 
problem. 
41 Indeed, the hypothesis has been presented that E2p49cs is actually the incorporation of 
an earlier work by Spinoza written in dialogical form: Ibid., 107 fn. 47. If this is true, then 
E2p48-49 can be read as an extended elaboration on the themes presented in the dialogue. 
42 “præter ipsas rerum ideas” (II/130/5) 
43 “adeoque (per definitionem 2 hujus) hæc affirmatio ad essentiam ideæ trianguli pertinet 
nec aliud præter ipsam est [et] quod præter ideam nihil sit.” (II/130/31–33, 35) 
44 “Voluntas et intellectus nihil præter ipsas singulares volitiones et ideas sunt” (II/131/4–
5) 
45 “At singularis volitio et idea […] unum et idem sunt” (II/131/5–6) 
46 “Incipio igitur a primo lectoresque moneo ut accurate distinguant inter ideam sive mentis 
conceptum et inter imagines rerum quas imaginamur. […] Quippe qui putant ideas 
consistere in imaginibus quæ in nobis ex corporum occursu formantur, sibi persuadent 
ideas illas rerum quarum similem nullam imaginem formare possumus, non esse ideas sed 
tantum figmenta quæ ex libero voluntatis arbitrio fingimus; ideas igitur veluti picturas in 
tabula mutas aspiciunt et hoc præjudicio præoccupati non vident ideam quatenus idea est, 
affirmationem aut negationem involvere. […] atque adeo clare intelliget ideam 
(quandoquidem modus cogitandi est) neque in rei alicujus imagine neque in verbis 
consistere. Verborum namque et imaginum essentia a solis motibus corporeis constituitur, 
qui cogitationis conceptum minime involvunt.” (II/131/30–132/21) 
47 cf. Donagan, A., “Homo Cogitat: Spinoza‟s Doctrine and Some Recent Commentators,” 
in Spinoza: Issues and Directions, ed. E. Curley and P.-F. Moreau (Brill, 1990), 102–12. That 
Descartes did not think that representational ideas are corporeal or image-like is non-
contentious. The real question is whether Spinoza by making the claim that the essence of 
images is constituted by corporeal motions really wants to say that images belong to the 
extended thing on the criticized view, or wants to say that the content of representations is 
determined by corporeal motions. In the first case if he wants to use this as a criticism of 
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Descartes he is certainly mistaken. In the second case arguably he has a good point against 
Descartes, since representations are produced by the union of body and mind and as such 
they require the movement of the corporeal animal spirits with which they are in some 
naturally, or what is the same, divinely determined correspondence. And in this sense it 
might be true that on Descartes‟ view the content of representations is determined by 
corporeal motion, even though representations themselves are not physical, but rather 
mental entities. However, in this paper I do not intend to evaluate Spinoza‟s assessment of 
Descartes‟s theory of ideas, which would require at least another article, but rather to argue 
for my claim that the metaphysical status of false beliefs in Spinoza is best assessed in 
comparison to the status of affirmations in Descartes. And for this argument I only need 
the uncontentious claim that both Spinoza and Descartes distinguished images and 
affirmations and that they had differing views on the relation of the two. I would like to 
think my anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point. cf. Sutton, J., “The Body and 
the Brain,” in Descartes’ Natural Philosophy, ed. S. Gaukroger, J. Schuster, and J. Sutton 
(Routledge, 2000), 697–722.; Szalai, J., “A test lélek problematika fõ descartes-i 
megközelítései,” Kellék, no. 32 (2007): 7–16; Paul Hoffman, “The Unity of Descartes‟s 
Man,” The Philosophical Review 95/ 3 (1986): 339–70.; Rozemond, M., Descartes’s Dualism 
(Harvard University Press, 2009). 
48 Images are indeed bodily modifications as defined in E2p17cs. 
49 As defined in E2p17cs: “Next, to retain the customary words, the affections of the 
human body whose ideas present external bodies as present to us, we shall call images of 
things, though they do not reproduce the [NS: external] figures of things. And when the 
mind regards bodies in this way, we shall say that it imagines.” 
50 It is important to emphasize that Spinoza does not claim that images are not erroneous 
in themselves, since images are extended modes. Spinoza claims that imaginations, ideas 
representing images, are not erroneous in themselves. 
51 This is the crucial aspect of Spinoza‟s notion of idea: as the explanation of the definition 
of idea emphasizes (E2d3e), ideas are not the passive perceptions (as representations in 
Descartes), but rather active perceptions (as attitudes in Descartes). His claim that every 
idea involves affirmation is already present in the definition of idea. This emphasis on 
conceiving is invoked in both uses of the mute picture objection. In E2p48s he states that 
ideas are not mere representations because they are conceived and what differentiates 
between mute pictures and ideas is that ideas involve affirmations. In E2p49cs also the fact 
that the idea is a concept of the mind is invoked to support the claim that ideas involve 
affirmation. 
52 “me concedere voluntatem latius se extendere quam intellectum si per intellectum claras 
tantummodo et distinctas ideas intelligant sed nego voluntatem latius se extendere quam 
perceptiones sive concipiendi facultatem.” (II/133/23–26) 
53 If we take into consideration that according to Spinoza the mute picture view is both 
theoretically and practically disadvantageous we can infer that Spinoza‟s main objection 
against Descartes‟s project was not that it was metaphysically untenable, but rather that it 
was practically unviable. On this reading while it is metaphysically impossible to suspend 
judgment, it is quite possible to negate every idea that is not clear and distinct, but this 
negation is either done only as utterance and not as belief, or it necessarily leads to a rather 
radical skepticism. I do not argue that this is a correct reading of Descartes‟s project, or 
that this is Spinoza‟s last word on it, I am just presenting an interpretation of Spinoza‟s 
criticism concerning Descartes‟s position on the relationship of will and intellect according 
to which the distinction he tries to make either implies self-deception, or skepticism. 
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“[…] they have been completely ignorant of this doctrine concerning the will. But it is 
quite necessary to know it, both for the sake of speculation and in order to arrange one‟s 
life wisely.” (E2p49cs) 
On the role of the refutation of skepticism in different periods of Spinoza‟s philosophy: 
Renz, U., “Finite Subjects in the Ethics,” in The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza, ed. M. Della 
Rocca (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Renz, U., (forthcoming).  
54 “Nam pars mentis æterna (per propositiones 23 et 29 hujus) est intellectus per quem 
solum nos agere dicimur (per propositionem 3 partis III); illa autem quam perire 
ostendimus, est ipsa imaginatio (per propositionem 21 hujus) per quam solam dicimur pati 
(per propositionem 3 partis III et generalem affectuum definitionem)” (II/306/12–16) 
55 The interpretation that there are two distinct sets of ideas, namely ideas of imagination 
and ideas of intellect, is embraced by the following authors: Wilson, M. D., (1996); Boros, 
G. (1997); Steinberg, D., (2005); Marshall, E., “Adequacy and Innateness in Spinoza,” in 
Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy IV, ed. D. Garber and S. Nadler (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 51–88.; Schliesser, E., Spinoza and the Philosophy of Science, ed. M. 
Della Rocca (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
56 The intellect provides knowledge, which is the only thing we know certainly to be good 
(E4p27); in perfecting our intellect consists man‟s highest happiness (E4app4); knowledge 
of the affects and ordering our ideas according to the order of intellect features in four of 
the five remedies against the power of affects (E5p20s); in this life we strive that “whatever 
is related to its memory or imagination is of hardly any moment in relation to the intellect” 
(E5p39s); finally, our salvation, blessedness and freedom consists in the intellectual love of 
God (E5p36cs). 
57 CSM I. 203-204 / AT 17. 
58 Lenz, M., (2013), 41. 
59 Belief understood as what is acted on, since on both Della Rocca‟s and Lenz‟s view one 
always has conflicting beliefs and there is no qualitative difference between the winning 
and the losing idea. 
60 “Et profecto plerique errores in hoc solo consistunt quod scilicet nomina rebus non 
recte applicamus. Cum enim aliquis ait lineas quæ ex centro circuli ad ejusdem 
circumferentiam ducuntur esse inæquales, ille sane aliud tum saltem per circulum intelligit 
quam mathematici. Sic cum homines in calculo errant, alios numeros in mente, alios in 
charta habent.” (II/128/23–29) 
61 I have used this awkward term in order to signal that correspondences between physical 
states and mental states determined by nature but not covered by the concept laws of 
nature are included. 
62 On my view even if something follows from our essence adequately, since our essence 
depends on God, it will follow from God. As Spinoza has replied to Blijenbergh: by 
becoming more perfect we can be knowing servants of God instead of being mere tools of 
God, but we do God‟s bidding nonetheless (Ep. 19 1665). Unfortunately, due to space 
considerations I am unable to elaborate on Spinoza‟s notion of freedom. 
63 Ep.23, 1665. 
64 Ep.23, 1665. 
